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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
---0000000---
CATHY JEAN TERRY JENSEN, 
Plain tiff-Appellant, 
Case No. 18, 312 
v. 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action in which the appellant wife 
challenges only the custody arrangements entered by the trial judge. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On November 10, 1980, a short trial was held before the 
District Court, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding. A Decree of 
Divorce was entered reserving all issues, including custody, for later 
determination. (R. at 28-29.) On August 3, 1981, a trial was held 
before the District Court, the Honorable Douglas L. Corna by presiding. 
Support, property distribution, and custody and visitation arrangements 
were entered. (R. at 77-80.) Thereafter, the appellant wife moved the 
1 
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trial court to reconsider the custody and visitation arrangements, which 
the court did, modifying its original visitation schedule. (R. at 
75-76.) Custody of the youngest child, Alisha, was awarded to the 
appellant mother; whereas, custody of the older child, Amber, was 
awarded to respondent father. (Id.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent David K. Jensen, respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the custody and visitation arrangements fashioned 
by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant-respondent David K. Jensen (hereinafter 
"Mr. Jensen") deems it necessary to present a concise statement of the 
facts of this case since the statement presented by plaintiff-appellant 
Cathy Jean Terry Jensen (hereinafter "Mrs. Jensen") fails to reflect 
accurately all of the relevant facts and circumstances at issue. 
Ur. and Mrs. Jensen were married on Decenber 17, 1976. 
(Tr. at 58.) The parties have two daughters, Amber Nichole Jensen 
(hereinafter ''Amber") and Alisha Dawn Jensen (hereinafter "Alisha"). 
Amber is now approximately five years of age and Alisha is now approxi-
mately is now approximately three and one-half years of age. During the 
pendency of the action, custody of both Amber and Alisha was temporarily 
2 
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with ~.1rs. Jensen by the stipulation of the parties and their original 
counsel. ( R. at 6-8.) 
A divergence of personal values between the parties led to the 
deterioration of the marriage. ~.1 rs. Jen sen liked to "socialize" (Tr. at 
93-97); occasionally drank alcoholic beverages (Tr. at 81 and 94-95); 
and formed a close relationship with a male neighbor (Tr. at 101-01). 
Mr. Jensen disapproved of these activities; was perhaps overly 
protective of ~.1rs. Jensen (Tr. at 14); and placed a higher degree of 
importance on religion and family values than did she (Tr. at 99). 
Called as a witness for Mr. Jensen, the Honorable J. Duffy 
Palmer testified that he had known ~.1r. Jensen for all of his life 
(Tr. at 3); that Mr. Jensen had a great deal of love for his children 
(Tr. at 6); and that Mr. Jensen was a very fit parent (Id.). Judge 
Palmer also testified that he had observed that, on occasion, when 
Mr. Jensen had picked up the children from ?.1rs. Jensen for visitation 
during the pendency of the action (while they were in her custody), the 
children were bruised and not in an acceptable state of cleanliness. 
(Tr. at 6.) Judge Palmer noted that the condition of the children when 
picked up from Mrs. Jesnen was "really pretty bad". (Tr. at 8.) 
At trial, a neighbor testified that Mrs. Jensen's care of the 
children while they were in her custody was less than exemplary. It was 
noted that the two young girls (then approximately one- and two-years of 
3 
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age) were left home alone at night, with ?.1rs. Jensen not returning until 
as late as 2:00 a.m. (Tr. at 79.) On occasion, ~.1rs. Jensen also left 
the children in soiled diapers for as long as two hours. (Tr. at 80.) 
An incident during a boating trip was noted in which ~.1rs. Jensen had 
lowered the pants of her swimsuit so as to display her derriere to a 
male neighbor within viewing distance of her daughters. (Tr. at 76-77.) 
There was also testimony that Mrs. Jensen used vile and obscene language 
in front of the children (Tr. at 101) and that she had, in fact, made 
efforts to teach Amber to use such language in referring to her father 
(Tr. at 102). The neighbor also testified without contradiction that 
Mrs. Jensen had spoken with her shortly before the trial had commenced 
and stated that if her testimony were to be unfavorable, facts that the 
witness had earlier disclosed to Mrs. Jensen in confidence would be 
related to the witness's husband. (Tr. at 77.) 
There was much testiG'lony during the course of the trial as to 
the extent and propriety of a relationship which had developed between 
Mrs. Jensen and a male neighbor. The district court found this testi-
mony credible, noting in his ruling from the bench that she had engaged 
in "some inappropriate relationships". (Ruling at 3.) There was also 
testimony that Mr. Jensen questioned whether the younger child, Alisha, 
was in fact his. (Tr. at 107.) 
The court was presented with two expert custody evaluations. 
The first was an independent evaluation prepared for the court by 
4 
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D. Steven Clark, a professional social worker with Social Services. 
(R. at 24.) The second was offered by William McVaugh, who was hired by 
Mrs. Jensen after she learned that the report prepared by Social 
Services was adverse to her. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "G", R. at 43.) 
The Social Services evaluation unqualifiedly recommended that 
custody of both children be placed with Mr. Jensen in the event that the 
court should find that "an illicit relationship" had existed between 
Mrs. Jensen and the male neighbor. Moreover, it was noted that even if 
the trial court were to be "unsure of her relationship with other 
males", the evaluator "would still be very concerned about having the 
children placed in her custody." (R. at 24.) Steven Clark also noted 
that ~·.1rs. Jensen tended to place the children's needs "secondary to her 
own social needs." (Id.) The evaluator even went so far as to 
recommend that Mrs. Jensen be allowed visitation only during daylight 
hours as he was "concerned about her social needs in the evening." 
(Id.) The trial court indicated that he had read and considered the 
Social Services recommendation. (Tr. at 118.) 
The only professional recommendation that custody be placed 
with Mrs. Jensen was the opinion of William ~.icVaugh. He had been 
retained by :'.1rs. Jensen and, more importantly, admitted not only that he 
had made no evaluation whatsoever of t.1r. Jensen (Tr. at 38) but also 
that an evaluation of Mr. Jensen would have been helpful (Tr. at 43). 
The basis of his opinion was that, when asked to draw a picture of her 
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family, Amber had included a character representing her mother and then 
asked whether her father should be included also, as 'he isn't living 
with us'. (Tr. at 33.) It appears that no consideration was made of 
the fact that, at the time of his interview with Amber, she had been in 
the temporary custody of l\1rs. Jensen for several months. 
Based upon all of the evidence before him, the trial court 
ruled that !.Irs. Jensen should have custody of the younger child, Alisha; 
and that Mr. Jensen should have custody of the older child, Amber. The 
trial court's original visitation schedule provided that the ·children 
should. be exchanged for one month during the summer and on weekends. 
Immediately following the trial, ~.1rs. Jensen moved from Utah and now 
resides in Carson City, Nevada. (Tr. of 12/8/81 Hearing at 3.) Faced 
with ~'.1rs. Jensen's decision to separate herself geographically from 
Utah, and in order to afford the children more time together, the trial 
court modified the visitation arrangements, providing that both children 
should be together for two months each sumner (one month with each 
parent) and that visitation be freely granted whenever ~\1rs. Jensen chose 
to come within the state of Utah. (Id. at 11-12.) 
Both the expert witness hired by Mrs. Jen sen and the district 
court pleaded with the parties to cease their hostilities or at least 
shield the children from them. (Exhibit G at p. 4 and R. at 63.) 
Nevertheless, this appeal ensued. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED CUSTODY AWARD 
OF THE TRIAL COURT IS PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE 
MODIFIED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE 
APPLICABLE LAW. 
It is apparent both from her Brief and from her ex parte 
letter to Judge Cornaby (R. at 59) that Mrs. Jensen is not pleased with 
the custody award. However, the fact that one of the ·parties to a 
divorce proceeding is dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling is not 
indicative either of the propriety or of the merit of the ruling. Such 
remonstrances are not unusual in the aftermath of the inherently 
emotional and psychologically traumatic divorce process. Being 
dissatisfied of the outcome of the trial and hearings, ~.1rs. Jensen now 
seeks to commence anew those proceedings. 
This Court has, on innumerable occasions, held that while a 
divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the trial judge is 
favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy. It is only in 
those few instances in which the appellant can clearly demonstrate a 
manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law that the decree 
fashioned by the trial judge will be disturbed. Such a position is 
logically grounded upon the advantaged position of the trial court, who 
has observed the witnesses, heard the testimony, and become acquainted 
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at least to a limited degree with the parties, their problems, and their 
properties. 
In a tacit recognition of the fact that the custody award 
fashioned by Judge Cornaby is supported by substantial credible 
evidence, Mrs. Jensen appears to rely upon the equitable nature of 
divorce proceedings in her invitation to this Court to revamp the 
original custody award. A similar invitation was refused in Eastman v. 
Eastman, 558 P. 2d 514 (Utah 1976), with the observation that: 
We have many times stated that even 
though proceedings in divorce cases are 
equitable, in which this Court may review 
the evidence, due to the prerogatives and 
advantaged position of the trial court, 
we give considerable deference to his 
findings and judgment; and we do not 
disturb them unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or he has 
abused his discretion, or misapplied 
prin ci pl es of law • 
558 P.2d at 516 (footnote citations omitted). It is, therefore, 
incumbent upon the appellant in a divorce case to demonstrate some clear 
abuse of discretion or misapplication of law before this Court will act 
to revise any aspect of the original decree. 
This Court has long held that its inherent power to supplant 
the trial judge's discretion is to be exercised only judiciously and 
infrequently. For example, in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 
977 (1956), it was held that: 
8 
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The more recent pronouncements of this 
court, and the policy to which we adhere, 
are to the effect that the trial judge 
has considerable latitude of discretion 
in such matters and that his judgment 
should not be changed lightly, and in 
fact, not at all, unless it works such a 
manifest injustice or inequity as to 
indicate a clear abuse of discretion. 
296 P. 2d at 981 (footnote omitted). 
In view of the amount of discretion accorded to the trial 
judge and this Court's requirement that a clear abuse of that discretion 
or misapplication of law be demonstrated as a condition precedent to any 
modification of the trial judge's ruling, the cases have frequently 
noted that the mere fact that a majority of the members of the reviewing 
court might, themselves, have reached a different ruling than did the 
trial court is insufficient to justify any modification of the original 
decree. This Court emphasized this principle in Christensen v. 
Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P. 2d 511 ( 1968), noting: 
Whether we as individual judges 
would or would not have arrived at the 
same exact formula as to what (might be] 
the most practical and just treatment 
• • . of this situation is not the 
question on this appeal. Even though it 
is the established rule that divorce 
cases being in equity, it is the duty of 
this court to review and weigh the 
evidence, it is equally true that we have 
invariably recognized the advantaged 
position of the trial judge and given 
deference to his findings and judgment, 
declaring that they should not be upset 
unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
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against them, or unless the decree works 
such an injustice that equity and good 
conscience demand that it be revised. An 
important consideration in this regard is 
"the elimination or minimization of 
frictions or difficulties in the 
future" • • • . 
444 P. 2d at 512-13 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
These sound principles of review in divorce cases were 
recently reaffirmed by this Court in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218 
(Utah 1980). In that case, this Court reiterated: 
In a divorce case, even though the 
proceedings are equitable and this Court 
may review the evidence, this Court 
accords considerable deference to the 
findings and judgment of the trial court 
due to its advantageous position. On 
appeal this Court will not disturb the 
action of the trial court unless the 
evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the trial court has abused 
its discretion or misapplied principles 
of law. In application of these precepts 
to the record herein there is no basis to 
interfere with the decision of the trial 
court. 
615 P. 2d at 1222 (footnotes omitted). 
Under the standards of review traditionally applied by this 
Court, the custody award entered in this case is presumed valid and will 
be affirmed unless Mrs. Jensen has demonstrated that Judge Cornaby has 
so clearly abused his discretion as to result in substantial prejudice 
or has misapplied the relevant law in this case to such a degree that 
the decree entered is manifestly unfair and inequitable. 
10 
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POINT li. APPELLANT HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET 
HER BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING SOME ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
OR MISAPPLICATION OF LAW; THEREFORE, THE CUSTODY AWARD 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Although appellant's Brief makes clear ~.1rs. Jensen's 
subjective dissatisfaction with the custody award entered by Judge 
Cornaby, it wholly fails to delineate a single instance in which the 
trial court either abused its discretion or misapplied the relevant law 
of this state. 
~.1rs .. Jensen first claims that "the only professional 
evaluation" with respect to custody recommended that custody of both 
Amber and Alisha be awarded to her. (App. Br. at 6.) That is not true. 
Although William MacVaugh recommended that Urs. Jensen--by whom he had 
been hired--be awarded custody of the children, the independent custody 
evaluation of D. Steven Clark strongly recommended that custody of both 
children be placed with ~.1r. Jensen. (R. at 24.) As noted in the 
Statement of Facts, the evidence adduced at the trial supports the 
concern of the Social Services evaluator that Mrs. Jensen places the 
welfare of the children second to her "social needs". 
Appellant next relies in her Brief upon this Court's decision 
in Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970). She presents a 
"quotation" from that decision (App. Br. at 8); however, the only 
language in that "quotation" helpful to her position is not found within 
11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the actual text of the opinion. (Compare 469 P.2d at 505 with App. Br. 
at 8.) In Wiese, which was a modification proceeding, this Court did 
reverse the trial court's refusal to modify custody arrangements. That 
decision, however, was based upon the uncontroverted testimony of two 
psychologists (one hired by each party) that the children were develop-
ing serious problems under the existing custody arrangements and would 
be benefited by a change. 469 P.2d at 507. The case has little, if 
any, applicability to the facts of the present situation. 
Similiarly devoid of merit are appellant's references to "the 
ancient story of Solomon". (App. Br. at 9.) ~1oreover, ~.1rs. Jensen has 
apparently failed to read the district court's order (prepared by her 
own counsel) modifying the visitation schedules (R. at 75-76) since she 
claims (App. Br. at 9-10) that Amber and Alisha will not be together 
even during visitation. As modified, the district Court's visitation 
schedule clearly provides for Amber and Alisha to spend two months 
together during the summer, one-half with Mrs. Jensen and one-half with 
Mr. Jensen. Had ~11rs. Jensen not chosen to remove herself to Carson 
City, Nevada, Amber and Alisha could similarly have enjoyed each other's 
company every weekend. 
In short, while :\1rs. Jen sen makes clear her dissatisfaction 
with the ruling of the district court, she has entirely failed to 
demonstrate any abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. Absent 
the demonstration of such errors, the trial court's custody award must 
be affirmed. ~.1oreover, by the time a ruling is entered in this appeal, 
12 
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Amber will have lived with her father for almost two years. As 
recognized by this Court in Hogge v. Hogge, --P. 2d-- (Utah June 17, 
1982), "the advantage of stability in custody arrangements . • • 
weigh[s] against changes in the party awarded custody." -- P.2d at 
Having failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion or 
misapplication of law by the district court, ~.1rs. Jensen's request that 
the custody award fashioned by the trial court be modified must be 
rejected. 
P-OINT tu. THE MERE FACT THAT CUSTODY OF THE TWO 
CHILDREN WAS SPLIT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ERROR. 
In her Brief, Mrs. Jensen complains not that the trial court 
erred in awarding custody of either child to r-.-Ir. Jensen, but that 
custody of the two children was split. This Court has recognized that 
the custody of siblings may, on occasion, have to be split. 
• 
For example, in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 
1979), two children were born as issue of the marriage and each parent 
was awarded the custody of one child. As in the present case, the 
mother appealed, challenging the award and arguing that custody of both 
children should have been awarded to her. This Court affirmed the split 
custody award fashioned by the trial court, notwithstanding its 
recognition of the "judicial preference" for the mother in child custody 
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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matters when all other considerations are balanced. In so holding, this 
Court observed: 
[The mother] is mistaken • • • in 
asserting that this preference entitled 
her to custody of both children in the 
present case. Pointing to the fact that 
the trial court made no finding that she 
was unfit as a mother, plaintiff asserts 
that the judicial policy entitles her to 
custody of the children as a matter of 
law. In fact, the preference operates to 
give custody to the mother all other 
things being equal. S-uch a preference is 
a creature of judicial policy, however, 
it must yield to the legislative mandate 
that the best interests of the child be 
given primary consideration. Whenever, 
pursuant to a consideration of such 
interests, any circunstances in a case 
preponderate in favor of the husband, all 
things are not equal. 
We should note, also, that the 
trial court is given particularly broad 
discretion in the area of ·child custody 
incident to separation or divorce 
proceedings. A determination of the 
"best interests of the child" frequently 
turns on numerous factors which the trial 
court is best suited to assess, given its 
proximity to the parties and the 
circumstances. Only where trial court 
action is so flagrantly unjust as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion should 
the appellate form interpose its own 
judgment. 
599 P. 2d at 511-12 (footnote omitted, original emphasis). In language 
as applicable to the present case as to the matter then under 
14 
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consideration, this Court went on to inventory and assess the factors 
justifying the trial court's split custody award: 
Testimony at trial bore out the court's 
finding that [the mother] was at the time 
of trial, and had been for a period of a 
year prior thereto, living with and 
carrying on an extra-marital relationship 
with another man, that such was the 
second such relationship to arise in the 
course of the five-year marriage; that 
[the mother's] present income was 
minimal; that the [father] is res pons-
ible, has adequate employment, enjoys a 
particularly close relationship with his 
son, and· is in all respects competent to 
care for him. Thus, while the court 
conceded that "both parties could qualify 
as proper persons to be awarded custody 
of [the children] , the evidence as a 
whole preponderates in favor of the 
[father] for custody of his minor son." 
As indicated above, the law requires no 
more than such a preponderance. While it 
is true that a child custody award which 
keeps all the children of a marriage 
united is generally pref erred to one 
which divides them between the parents, 
that preference is not binding in the 
face of considerations dictating a 
contrary course of action. 
599 P. 2d at 512. In the present case, the trial court's decision to 
award custody of Amber (who is now approximately five years of age) to 
the father was well justified. Faced with a particularly difficult and 
onerous decision, the wisdom of the trial court--who had a first-hand 
opportunity to observe the parties and their witnesses--should not be 
disturbed. 
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Likewise, in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), 
this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to split custody of the 
parties' six children, with the three younger children being awarded to 
the mother and the three older children being awarded to the father. In 
so holding, this Court noted : 
This Court will not upset the trial 
court's judgment in custodial matters 
unless it is persuasively shown to be 
contrary to the best interests and 
welfare of the children and family. 
615 P. 2d at 1224 (footnote omitted). The custody award in the present 
action should likewise be affirmed even though the trial court found 
that, in the children's best interests, it was necessary to divide their 
custody between the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
The only issue in this appeal relates to the custody of the 
parties' two daughters, Amber and Alisha. Particularly with respect to 
matters relating to custody, this Court has consistently adhered to the 
precept that the trial court's judgment will not be set aside unless the 
appellant clearly demonstrates that the trial court has abused its 
discretion or misapplied relevant law. ~.1rs. Jensen has made no such 
showing in the present case. 
Faced with substantial testimony of less than exemplary and 
even inappropriate conduct by Mrs. Jensen, an independent custody 
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evaluation strongly recommending that custody of both children be placed 
with Mr. Jensen, and the fact that Mr. Jensen himself questioned whether 
he was the father of Alisha, the trial court displayed exemplary wisdom 
in awarding custody of Amber to Mr. Jensen and custody of Alisha to 
:'.1 rs. Jensen. 
Faced with :\1rs. Jensen's decision to leave the state of Utah 
immediately after the trial of this action, the trial court has 
fashioned the most practical visitation schedule possible for the 
children. They will spend a substantial portion of each summer in each 
other's company and will be permitted to spend as much time together 
during the rest of the year as Mrs. Jensen's travel plans will permit. 
The carefully considered custody award of the district court 
should be affirr.1ed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisBJl day of July, 1982. 
DART & STEGALL 
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